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The paper examines the pattern of Greece’s European Union policy making in 
a historical perspective. It starts by presenting the phases of EU Policymaking 
of successive Greek governments since the 1980s, and considers the 
persistent deficiencies of the Greek public administration vis-à-vis EU law 
transposition and implementation. Then it turns to the different models for EU 
policymaking and introduces the Finnish case as a successful example. The 
final section outlines relevant policy proposals, taking into account the 
changing Greek and Eurozone environment amidst the ongoing crisis. 
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Accession to the EC undoubtedly constitutes the greatest post-war 
achievement in Greece’s international relations. The country’s European 
policy offers an interesting case study, reflecting attempts to bridge its 
political and economic identity as a West European country with a 
distinct cultural heritage and Balkan/East Mediterranean historical and 
geographic parameters. During the Cold War this task had been rather 
easy; however, resolving the post-Cold War dilemmas and, above all, 
steering through the tsunamis of the euro crisis has been a tall order.  
Half a century after Greece’s Association Treaty (1961) and thirty-one 
years after accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), the 
European orientation appears firmly embedded in Greek public opinion. 
It took almost the whole first decade of Greece’s EC membership for the 
centre-left political forces (PASOK) to agree that participation in the 
community process was positive for Greece.1 Still, the country entered 
the post-Cold War period with bi-partisan support for deeper European 
integration. 
Over the years, and more so following the 2008 financial crisis, 
Europeans have been discovering that borders are no longer barriers; 
that the distinction between foreign, European and domestic policy is 
dissolving; that the future well-being and security of each member state 
                                                 
1 For an appraisal of Greece’s first ten-year record of EC membership, see Tsoukalis (1992). 
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cannot be separated from that of the others in the Union. Yet, just at the 
moment when the accelerating pace of the global crisis needs a more 
focused and confident Europe, European leaders became unsure of the 
way forward and many member states became introspective and 
uncertain. Memories of the wider reasons for building a shared Europe 
and the euro began to fade. The prospect of a Japanese-style, euro-area 
economic stagnation for the next decade or more will test not only 
Greece’s place in Europe, but also the firmness of the bonds between 
elite political commitment to a European federation scheme and the 
strained electorates’ national harsh economic realities. Nowhere is this 
rising conflict better exhibited than in Greece.  
Naturally, this paper focuses on Greece’s European policy-making. As the 
issues on which the EU holds exclusive, shared or other competence 
have substantially expanded over the years, so has the internal need for 
the member states to effectively coordinate and manage their European 
policies. 
Even though a full member since 1981, as of today, Greece has not yet 
fully organised and coherently coordinated its policy-making towards the 
European Union. So far, this issue has not attracted neither scholarly, 
nor political or media attention. The relevant literature remains limited, 
not only with regard to Greece (with some notable exceptions such as 
Glynos 2011; Ioakimidis 1998; Makridimitris and Passas 1994), but also 
to other EU member states. Indeed, it is surprising that a central 
question pertaining to the national coordination of EU policy-making, 
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has received comparatively little attention in the literature on EU 
affairs.2  
For most of history, yesterday has been a reliable guide to tomorrow. 
The future resembled the past in its most important features; stable 
routines were deeply ingrained in the patterns of everyday life. The 
present crisis takes Greece and Europe beyond the boundaries of such 
familiarities. Yet, whatever the difficulties, it is the political choices that 
will be made by Greece that will define its future and its new position in 
Europe. Ultimately, it will be through delivery that Greece will build itself 
the capacity to act. The means will flow from a clear vision of the 
purpose and a master plan for the next decade. European policy will be a 
central element of this plan.  
 
1. Introduction: Greece’s Strategy towards Accession to the EEC 
Greece became a full member of the EEC in January 1981. This accession 
was a major success of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and was 
achieved mainly through skilful political negotiation. From the very early 
stage of Greece’s democratic transition and consolidation after the 
1967-1974 military dictatorship, accession to the EEC became the 
fundamental foreign policy goal of the country. After his triumphant 
election in November 1974, Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis 
eagerly pursued this goal through intensive lobbying with EEC members 
(particularly with France and Germany) and the Commission (Valinakis, 
1981). 
                                                 
2 For example, see Kassim et al (2000). 
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As the country had recently emerged from a dictatorship, membership 
was seen as a way to consolidate Greece’s re-born but still fragile 
democracy. Even though the EEC was taken by surprise by the Greek 
accession request, it had an important stake both in the democratic 
orientation of Greece, Spain and Portugal, and in ensuring stability 
across its southern borders. Greece’s pro-Western course was perceived 
as still ambivalent, as the country was coming out of a dictatorship, with 
an open wound in Cyprus (following the Turkish invasion and 
subsequent occupation of the northern part of the island) and a strongly 
anti-US public opinion as a result of American support to the junta. 
Greece, therefore, needed to be rapidly anchored through EU 
membership. 
PM Karamanlis exercised strong and continuous pressure on France and 
Germany to accelerate the accession process. In terms of institutional 
preparations, meeting the accession criteria and transposing the acquis 
was widely seen in Greece as a demanding but rather technical process, 
which required effective coordination between a few ministries, 
basically between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Coordination 
(Economy) and Agriculture. 
In 1976 the Greek Parliament enacted Law 445/19763, which entrusted 
the Central Negotiation Committee with the task of managing, 
coordinating and negotiating Greece’s accession process to the EEC. 
Initially, it was answerable to the Ministry of Coordination and, after 
1977, to a Minister without Portfolio. A European Communities 
                                                 
3 Law 445, 30.9/1.10.1976: “on Greece’s representation in the European Communities and 
the organization of its administrative services in view of the implementation of the acquis 
communautaire” 
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Directorate was also established within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
assigned with the task of working closely with the Ministry of 
Coordination and assisting it in the negotiation and accession process.   
Since 1977, the anti-EU rhetoric and increased pressure by the 
opposition leader Andreas Papandreou convinced the European leaders 
and the Commission of the internal fragility of the accession process. 
Overcoming objections concerning the readiness of the new member 
state, the Community finally closed accession negotiations in May 1979 
and welcomed Greece as its tenth member state (Bache and Stephen, 
2006). 
Thus, accession negotiations were very short, even by the standards of 
the 1970s4, because the acquis communautaire was still quite limited, 
and the European Political Cooperation in its infancy. Under these 
circumstances, the overall administrative capacity of the Greek state -to 
implement the acquis communautaire and operate effectively within the 
Community- was generally expected to be built after the accession. 
Once the Accession Act was signed in Athens in May 1979, the New 
Democracy government further proceeded with empowering the 
Ministry of Coordination to supervise the speedy implementation of the 
acquis in view of Greece’s formal accession in January 1981 (Law 
992/1979). Thus, experts in European affairs were recruited and 
subsequently staffed the MFA’s EC Directorate, Greece’s Permanent 
                                                 
4 A comparison with the more recent or current accession processes is striking. As suggested 
by some researchers “the accession of post-communist states was more than any other EU 
enlargement, reform-led, affecting domestic institutional arrangements to a much greater 
extent than Europeanization has affected older member states” (see Dimitrova and 
Maniokas, 2004). 
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Representation in Brussels, and the services of the Ministry of 
Coordination. 5 
On the eve of formal accession to the EEC, Law 1104/19806 assigned 
responsibility for Greece’s EEC affairs to the MFA. In terms of internal 
coordination, the Ministry of Coordination was assigned responsibility 
for economic policy, but through inter-ministerial coordination 
committees, and above all through the day-to-day work of the 
Permanent Representation in Brussels. The latter was a new institutional 
framework which conferred in essence the central role to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
2.  The Evolving Institutional Framework 
Greece’s Europeanization needs to be examined in the context of the 
evolving national policy vis-à-vis the EU, as well as the transformations 
taking place at European level, particularly since the second half of the 
1980s.  Thus, the mechanisms set for the internal coordination of 
Greece’s European policy have essentially been reflecting the evolution 
of government attitudes towards the Union, which gradually moved 
from a defensive, nationalistic and subsidy-centred approach, towards a 
more open, flexible and “Europeanised” stance. Furthermore, they 
reflect the inherent characteristics and underlying logic, norms and 
procedures of the political and administrative system they have been 
part of (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004:4). 
                                                 
 5 Law 992, 18/21.12.1979 “On implementation of the Treaty of Accession of Greece to the 
European Communities and on relevant institutional and organizational issues.  
6 Law 1104/29.12.1980: “On Greece’s Representation to the EEC, the establishment of 
diplomatic and consular authorities, and other related organizational issues”. 
  7 
2.1 The first period: 1981-1985 
In October 1981, a few months after accession, PASOK won the elections 
on a largely anti-EEC and anti-NATO ticket. The period 1981-1985 is 
characterised by persistently strong PASOK doubts about the European 
integration process. Contrary to Constantine Karamanlis’ clearly pro-
western stance, Andreas Papandreou established the political identity of 
PASOK advocating for a “more independent” foreign policy and a 
“special” relationship status with the EEC. 
While in the opposition, the Greek Socialists had been openly hostile 
towards the EC, which was seen as a mechanism allowing larger member 
states to impose their views and restrict the ability of smaller partners to 
play an autonomous political role.  Political discourse was predominantly 
adversarial, framing the EU as a source of constraints on independent 
policy-making (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004:7). Moreover, in 
contrast to ND, which laid emphasis on the political character of the 
European project, PASOK perceived the EC primarily as an economic 
community. The first Andreas Papandreou government sought to 
renegotiate the country’s position within the Community based on its 
electoral commitment to a ‘special relationship’: economic cohesion 
should precede political cooperation. This doctrine is reflected in the 
Memorandum submitted by Greece in March 1982, asking for 
“additional divergence from implementing certain Community policies, 
as well as further economic support in order to restructure the Greek 
economy” (MFA, 2011). 
As a result of PASOK’s ambivalent stance, administrative capacity 
building to meet EU membership demands was all but eagerly pursued 
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in the first critical years after accession; the pace was normal to slow, 
rather than accelerated. Not only was there no effort to meet the new 
EEC requirements, but also the reforms and administrative preparations, 
which had been initiated by the ND government, were frozen or simply 
dismantled.7  
The overall administrative reforms introduced in Greece during 
Papandreou’s first term in government (1981-1985) sought to re-
establish state-society relations under the veil of democratisation 
(Spanou, 1996). Many of the measures adopted were simply 
unnecessary and, instead of strengthening, they further weakened the 
capacities of the country’s public administration (Makridimitris & Pravita, 
2011). The most crucial of them were the abolition of competitions for 
recruitment to the civil service (L. 1320/1983) and subsequent emphasis 
on social criteria rather than merit; the abolition of General Directorates 
(L.1232/1982) leading to the replacement of the experienced General 
Directors (top-grade civil servants) with inexperienced political 
appointees, the so-called “Special Secretaries”. Essentially, the civil 
service hierarchy collapsed, and “advisers” and all sorts of revocable 
staff, directly associated to the ministers, flooded and eroded the 
administrative structure (Spanou, 1996)8. The public sector expanded 
                                                 
7 For example, in 1980, PM George Rallis set up a European Administration School (with an 
international faculty) in Corfu to train civil servants on European issues. A few months after 
the elections, PASOK closed down the School.  
8 Other Laws in the same direction were the creation of the National Centre of Public 
Administration (pre-entry and in-service training), the appraisal system, the abolition of the 
civil servants “personal files” (1400/1983), and the remuneration system (1505/84). During 
the second PASOK government (1985-89), a new grade and career system (L. 1586/86) and a 
new appraisal system were introduced, while the recruitment system (L. 1735/87) and the 
pay system (L. 1810/88) were revised once again. Furthermore, a law concerning the 
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dramatically, a very large number of new government agencies, 
departments and “institutes” were created; the number of state 
employees multiplied within a few years (Makridimitris & Pravita, 2011). 
These reforms shaped the Greek public service and produced longer-
term consequences that are still evident today. The democratisation and 
“redistribution of benefits/ popular sovereignty/ social emancipation” 
that formed the ideological basis of PASOK’s accession to power in 1981, 
materialised on the basis of a clientelistic logic, which in turn established 
a non-meritocratic culture. A particularistic philosophy underlined the 
distribution of socioeconomic benefits, leading to greater inequalities 
(Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004). Furthermore, an economic model 
reliant on the state protecting particular interests (absence of 
competition and access to resources) was established (Dimitrakopoulos 
and Passas, 2004). As a consequence, these “reforms” set long-term 
patterns such as: (i) patronage in the recruitment to the civil service; (ii) 
centralising tendencies in state organisation; and (iii) the heavy presence 
of the state in the economy (Spanou and Sotiropoulos, 2011). These 
widely documented chronic maladies eventually led to an unproductive 
and inefficient system. Dimitrakopoulos and Passas (2004:7) characterise 
policy-making and agenda-setting of that period as ‘disjointed and 
reactive’. 
In line with its political leadership, the Greek bureaucracy adopted a 
defensive attitude; policy implementation was approached in a 
correspondingly neglectful and loose manner (Dimitrakopoulos & 
                                                                                                                                            
citizens-administration relationships (1599/1986) established “open government” and 
access to government information rights.” (Spanou, 1996) 
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Richardson, 2001). Given the elite and extroverted nature of the 
diplomatic service, the MFA fared better: a small and flexible MFA unit 
was created; chaired by a “Secretary General of the Ministry, 
Responsible for EEC Affairs” to address the issues arising from EEC 
membership and Greece’s first Presidency (second half of 1983); and 
charged to monitor all EEC-related policy sectors and the various 
working groups of the Council in Brussels. 
The coordinating role of the MFA was further strengthened through 
institutionalised inter-ministerial preparatory meetings in view of the 
COREPER deliberations. The General Directors were removed, and the 
(mostly inexperienced) political appointees represented the Ministers. 
The most fervid inter-ministerial debates were usually centred on the 
negotiation of Community funds. Usually allocated on the basis of 
political (and partisan) criteria, they were mostly wasted. 
 
2.2 The 1985-1995 Period 
PASOK’s stand on Europe improved substantially in the second A. 
Papandreou term. Although economic performance continued to 
diverge from the EU average and significant differentiations remained in 
foreign policy (MFA, 2011), PASOK progressively developed an 
increasingly supportive stance towards integration. One of the most 
critical factors was certainly the advent of abundant EU funds for 
agriculture and cohesion policy, leading A. Papandreou to soften his 
anti-EU rhetoric. Greece came in support of the Single European Act 
(S.E.A.) and progressively tilted by the end of the 1980s in favour of the 
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“federal integration model” and further expansion of the powers of the 
European Commission and Parliament (MFA, 2011). 
In the second half of the 1980s, the steady increase of the Community’s 
competencies, propelled by the J. Delors Commission, as well as the 
softening of PASOK’s anti-EEC tone led to a slow and still hesitant 
process of Europeanization. Institutionally, the necessity arose during 
this process to create a ministerial post for European Affairs: the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs took again the decisive lead and the first 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was assigned direct responsibility for 
European affairs (L.1558/1985).  
Coordination between ministries and services was however carried out 
by the MFA mostly on an ad hoc basis. In cases of joint competencies 
between ministries, devising positions and action was usually 
coordinated through informal and ad hoc inter-ministerial committees. 
Undoubtedly, the minister’s/deputy minister’s personality and real 
political ranking within the government were crucial every time he had 
to exercise pressure to other ministries.  
Regarding the transposition and implementation of Community Law, the 
“Special Legal Department for European Community Law” (ENYEK) of the 
MFA was established in 1986 (L.1640/1986). It assisted and collaborated 
with the relevant departments of competent Ministries, providing legal 
support and advice, representing the Hellenic Republic at the European 
Court of Justice and ensuring the harmonisation between European and 
national legislation. 
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Greece’s EEC/EU Presidencies were used during this period as 
opportunities. Every time Greece was set to assume the Presidency, the 
national administration would proceed to an occasional enhancement 
and upgrading of the European policy mechanisms, both in political 
terms (the post of an Alternate Foreign Minister was created) and in 
terms of recruiting additional experts. 
The period between 1985 and 1995 was unprecedented in terms of 
European integration and the expansion of the acquis communautaire; 
the Schengen Treaty (1985), the Single European Act (1987) and the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) came into force, while the accession of the 
EFTA countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) took place in 1995. A new 
large-scale enlargement process to the twelve Central Eastern European 
(CEE) and Mediterranean countries began in the same period. As a 
consequence of a growing acquis, the candidate countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe were subjected to lengthier and more complicated 
accession negotiations. The enlargement process became very complex 
and structured; it also required the building of the relevant 
administrative capacities prior to accession. As a result, the 
administrative reforms were practically imposed on the prospective 
members; the emphasis was now on implementation, and not simply on 
passing legislation. The new members were consequently better 
prepared, and Europeanization was achieved before, rather than after, 
EU accession. 
With European affairs increasingly revolving around horizontal themes, 
additional challenges arose in the management of European issues at 
the level of national public administration. The Greek MFA adapted by 
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incorporating ad hoc meetings and “contact points” for the coordination 
of positions on particular issues. Alongside that, a coordinating body, the 
Committee of International and European Relations, was created, first at 
the MFA and later at the level of the Council of Ministers Secretariat 
(Glynos, 2011:24). 
 
2.3 The post-1996 period 
Under PM Constantine Simitis (1996-2004), fulfilling the Maastricht 
criteria and joining the EMU became a political priority; this propelled 
efforts towards greater economic and social convergence. Simitis’ policy 
therefore constituted a drastic change from traditional PASOK policies of 
increased public spending and borrowing. This time public finances 
needed to be consolidated. 
The effort to join the Eurozone was essentially an elite-driven process 
and was successfully carried out; Greece became a member of the EMU 
on an essentially political rationale in January 2002. Although the 
strategic framework was not put under public debate, the programme 
was met by an unprecedented consensus across the political spectrum 
(with the exception of the Communist Party) (Dimitrakopoulos and 
Passas, 2004:143). Analysts have further argued that, given the 
particularities of Greece, it was the specific nature of the criteria and 
programming set, in combination with the impetus of adopting the euro, 
that led to some economic reforms (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 
2004:9). 
At the organisational level, the Simitis government proceeded to a 
limited re-organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Law 
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2594/1998). However, the upgraded Directorate-General “C”, 
responsible for European Union Affairs9, was staffed by a small number 
of diplomats, disproportionate to the ever-expanding range of issues 
spanning from external relations to the internal market, agriculture etc. 
It is indicative that a single (and small) Directorate, C2, became over the 
years responsible for all issues related to “European Integration and 
Economic and Monetary Policy”. Furthermore, with diplomats avoiding 
the DG C and the Permanent Representation in Brussels, important 
issues increasingly fell under the responsibility of experts, usually 
recruited by political and clientelistic criteria. 
The fourth Greek Presidency of the EU in 2003 coincided with the 
accession of ten new member states. Due to the unprecedented scale of 
preparations and coordination required, the Permanent Representation 
in Brussels eventually undertook this role. This further strengthened its 
role in the EU affairs mechanism, while competent ministries became 
more independent in handling respective issues through their 
representatives. However, as Glynos (2011:24) notes, the civil service 
was essentially left out since these representatives were often direct 
envoys of each minister, who communicated directly and carved policy 
independently from the ministry’s services, thus further hindering a 
more comprehensive and lasting management of issues. 
Although increasingly defied, the MFA-centred system of inter-
ministerial coordination was maintained during the Kostas Karamanlis 
period (2004-2009), with the post of Alternate Minister being changed 
to a Deputy Minister. Although he maintained the same responsibilities, 
                                                 
9 Directorate General A is responsible for political affairs and Directorate General B for 
economic affairs.  
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drawbacks arose in coordinating the ministries involved, because of the 
inherent difficulty for a Deputy Minister to preside over relevant 
meetings with other Ministers. The new Law (3566) on the Foreign 
Ministry introduced in 2007 once again confirmed the leading and 
coordinating role of this Ministry “in the planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of the country’s European and overall foreign policy” (Article 
5). In reality, the inter-ministerial quarrel only grew stronger. 
PM George Papandreou initially (2009) introduced a confusing and 
complex system consisting of a double-hated Prime Minister / Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and an Alternate Minister substituting for the PM/FM 
over practically the whole spectrum of foreign and European affairs. 
These deficiencies were addressed a year later through the re-
instalment of the traditional system (Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Alternate Minister for European Affairs), recently reproduced by the L. 
Papademos transition government. 
 
3.  The Impact of Public Administration Deficiencies on EU 
Policy 
Despite several reforms and institutional evolution, Greece’s internal 
coordination system has essentially remained inefficient. Executive 
centralisation is a characteristic of the Greek political system, often 
correlated with planning flaws, diffusion of responsibility and a lack of 
coordination evident in all policy sectors (Stoforopoulos and 
Makridimitris, 1997). European policy has been no exception. In practice, 
the Prime Minister holds a central role in arbitrating between ministers / 
ministries and other executive branches. All Prime Ministers have often 
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directly intervened to prompt personal collaboration between Ministers, 
given continuous personal rivalries and inter-ministerial antagonisms. 
Ministers and ministries have often functioned more as competitive 
entities than parts of a whole. Diverging personal agendas and political 
rivalries have constituted chronic maladies of the Greek administration 
system. On top of the state mechanism labyrinth, overlapping 
competencies are in stark contrast with the demands of the increasing 
complexity of European issues. As a result the system has been rendered 
ineffective (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997:  49-50). 
Collective governmental institutions, such as the Council of Ministers 
and inter-ministerial committees, such as the “Governmental Council for 
Foreign Affairs and Defence” (KYSEA) and the “Committee of 
International Economic Relations”, were designed as a remedy to the 
highly fragmented nature of the system. The system prohibited drawing 
up and following a long-term strategy in line with national priorities and 
planning needs. In reality, their role was restricted; the practice of 
sparse ad hoc meetings has practically limited coordination and has very 
rarely touched upon drawing the strategic priorities of national policy 
(Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 45). As noted by Glynos 
(2011:13) “the centralized system for designing, implementing and 
evaluating EU policies has been particularly weak; these functions are 
being usually carried through only in the context of the overall 
governmental planning and without significant technical support from 
ministries’ services and other agencies”.  
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3.1 The role of Parliament 
The role of the Hellenic Parliament in European affairs has been rather 
limited, which further reflects the executive centralisation of Greece’s 
parliamentary democracy (Maravegias & Tsinisizelis, 2007: 151). Most 
plenary sessions have been party-polemical confrontations, although 
European affairs have generally attracted the more experienced and 
informed MPs. 
Historically, European affairs were initially part of the overall foreign 
policy parliamentary agenda. The Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Parliamentary Committee has played the dominant role, in particular 
with regard to the ratification of Treaties. However, as pointed out by 
Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris (1997), members of these committees 
are appointed by the political parties by various criteria, not necessarily 
always on the basis of merit and knowledge of issues. The often limited 
expertise of MPs is accentuated by party polemical lines and poor 
research support, which does not allow members to go beyond 
generalities and party positions. The use of specialised and in-depth 
hearings has been limited, although the 3566/2007 MFA law achieved 
some progress. 
The creation of a “Special Standing Committee on European Affairs” in 
1990 was a major step forward10. It consisted of MPs and MEPs from all 
parties, and was tasked to debate and monitor EU-related issues, 
Greece’s role in European integration, the acts of EU institutions, and 
matters of cooperation between the Hellenic Parliament, the European 
Parliament, and other national parliaments (Hellenic Parliament, n.d.). 
                                                 
10 See www.cosac.eu/en  
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The Minister appears before the Committee to inform on developments 
in EU affairs, although he/she retains the right not to disclose any 
confidential information.11 Furthermore, the government submits to the 
Parliament all EU draft regulatory acts and reports, such as draft treaties, 
common positions and action plans involving foreign relations, 
Regulations and Directives, and White Books.  
In practice, the Committee’s role was often restricted to being informed 
and commenting on the results of European Councils. Given the primary 
legislative character of Parliamentary committees and the particular 
nature of EU policy, a more substantial involvement of this Committee 
has been inhibited. Moreover, given the more complex character of EU 
affairs and their low attractiveness to the public and voters, media 
attention has been rare. Essentially, these committees have been 
functioning as closed MP forums, where the practice of intense 
confrontation between government and opposition has not usually 
allowed for in-depth debates and innovative proposals.  
The institutional power of the Parliament and its Committees has been 
more evident on the occasion of EU Treaty revisions. According to Article 
28§2 of the Constitution, the ratification of treaties or agreements 
granting authority/jurisdiction to international organisations need to be 
voted by an increased (three-fifths) parliamentary majority12. However, 
                                                 
11 Standing Orders of the Hellenic Parliament, Article 41B, 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/Kanonismos-tis-Voulis/article-41b/  
12 Article 28 of the Constitution of Greece states that: “1. The generally recognized rules of 
international law, as well as international conventions as of the time they are sanctioned by 
statute and become operative according to their respective conditions, shall be an integral 
part of domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law. The rules 
of international law and of international conventions shall be applicable to aliens only under 
the condition of reciprocity. 2. Authorities provided by the Constitution may by treaty or 
  19 
given the often fierce opposition, governments have mostly refrained 
from using this provision (and the risk-taking it entails) as the legal basis, 
preferring the security of absolute majority (art.28§3). This 
parliamentary practice was followed in the case of major EU treaties, 
including the Constitutional and Lisbon ones, as well as in the more 
recent loan agreements to Greece by the IMF, the ECB and the European 
Commission. 
 
3.2 Lobbying in Brussels 
Poor internal coordination has taken its toll on the effective 
representation of Greece and the strategic promotion of its interests in 
Brussels. The importance of this process and the role that European 
institutions play in critically shaping policies are self-evident. A proactive 
approach during the initial stages of policy formulation at European level 
is therefore essential for member states in their effort to ensure the 
accommodation of their interests (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004:8).  
The European Commission has the monopoly over policy initiation. 
However, it consults formally or informally with stakeholders, at the 
stage of preparing draft proposals, to ensure that the proposal will be 
supported (or at least will not meet extensive resistance) once 
submitted to the Council and the Parliament. Lobbying at this stage is 
                                                                                                                                            
agreement be vested in agencies of international organizations, when this serves an 
important national interest and promotes cooperation with other States. A majority of 
three-fifths of the total number of Members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law 
auctioning the treaty or agreement. 3. Greece shall freely proceed by law passed by an 
absolute majority of the total number of Members of Parliament to limit the exercise of 
national sovereignty, insofar as this is dictated by an important national interest, does not 
infringe upon the rights of man and the foundations of democratic government and is 
effected on the basis of the principles of equality and under the condition of reciprocity.” 
http://www.hri.org/docs/syntagma/  
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imperative since the Commission’s proposals are in many cases adopted 
largely unchanged by the Council. Given the highly fragmented nature of 
policy formation at European level, lobbying involves networking with 
policy actors, from Commission officials to interest groups, ensuring a 
flow of information to realistically assessing opportunities and 
constraints, as well as building alliances (Kassim, Menon, Peters, and 
Wright, 2001). 
Greece has traditionally been employing rather reactive tactics. 
Attempts to influence EU policy-making are limited to the Council, 
usually only after the submission of Commission proposals, a point when 
significant changes are much more difficult. Essentially, Greek public 
administration has refrained from actively devising coordinated national 
positions and plans and then lobby to influence the Commission’s 
proposals. 
The timely identification of crucial issues in the context of EU 
programming is also of utmost importance.13 For member states seeking 
to amplify their influence on EU law-making, promoting national 
positions should start at the formulation of policy proposals stage in the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. In the case of 
Greek administration, however, forming coordinated positions well in 
advance to be able to influence European policy-making has not been 
effectively pursued, nor carried out (Glynos, 2011:18-19).  
                                                 
13 Ideally, not only the midterm (18month) programming should be taken into consideration, 
but also the long-term (5year) programming presented by the European Commission to the 
European Parliament, which is quite detailed and is reformulated on a rolling basis, now 
even publicised online. (Glynos, 2011) 
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As a result of reactive tactics, there have been many statements of 
“general reservations”, which however were later on usually withdrawn, 
thereby leading in pre-shaped policies being accepted with minimum 
negotiation (Glynos, 2011:11). Even though this approach is common 
with smaller or new member states, other medium-sized EU members, 
not to speak of the larger ones, have been able to actively intervene and 
effectively lobby in all stages of the policy-making process. 
Greece’s most experienced diplomats have mostly headed the 
Permanent Representation in Brussels. It has traditionally tried to 
exercise pressure on the national administration, and often Ministers 
themselves, to bring about the formation of national positions, and 
generally accelerate the overall management of EU affairs. But, 
essentially, the effectiveness of Greece’s representation in Brussels 
reflects the domestic coordination weaknesses and inadequate steering 
capacity of the Athenian establishment (Spanou, 2001). Resembling a 
“truncated pyramid”, a structure lacking a unifying element at the top, 
the “whole policy and co-ordination system is tested at the EU level, 
where the real competition of interests takes place and where gains and 
losses are incurred. In Brussels, the question is not anymore one of mere 
co-ordination (means), but of influence on the decision making process 
(ends)” (Spanou, 2001:164). 
 
3.3 The Structural Deficiencies 
Not surprisingly, analysts dealing with Greece’s policy formation system 
have evaluated it as “defensive, reactive and highly fragmented, and 
lacking institutional memory, political continuity and predictability” 
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(Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004:4). Rammata (2011) observes that 
vertical sectors traditionally preside over horizontal services, largely due 
to social, political, administrative and corporatist reasons. Gradually, 
horizontal structures are further weakened, while service sectors carve 
policies in an increasingly autonomous manner; which subsequently 
detracts from the consistency and continuity of positions  (Rammata, 
2011: 255). 
Observers of Greek affairs have pointed out that the handling of EU 
affairs is mostly carried out through ad hoc procedures, even though 
institutionalised arrangements exist (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004; 
Glynos, 2011). This leads to dependence on individual capacities and 
agendas, rather than transparent and stable mechanisms. Furthermore, 
policy-making is disproportionately dependent on the individual 
minister, his/her style and particular interests, which results in a loss of 
continuity and even, change in direction, whenever the minister 
changes. 
A major deficiency of the Greek system is the lack of common patterns 
as to how European policy-making is carried out in each ministry. 
Rammata (2011) indicated that each ministry follows a sui generis 
approach to managing policies that form part of the acquis. Although 
some ministries have introduced a “Departments of EU Affairs”, in 
certain cases responsibility still falls under directorates/departments of 
“Relations with International Organisations”, a clear indication that 
there has been practically no change since the entry to the EU. 
Incidentally, this also shows reduced political interest in devoting the 
necessary resources to systematically follow EU affairs and effectively 
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proact developments in Brussels. Rammata further argues that this 
organisational heterogeneity and lack of autonomous departments is 
clearly responsible for the poor management of EU affairs in Greece 
(Rammata, 2011:254).  
Inadequate communication and coordination inside and between 
ministries plays an even more important role in cases of shared 
competencies. The directly competent ministry often takes coordination 
initiatives, even though it does not have, in institutional terms, the 
means to resolve conflicts arising from this collaboration. This leads to 
the adoption of ad hoc methods for addressing issues that do not always 
serve the long-term national interests, nor ensure timely responsiveness 
by the country (Rammata, 2011:256). 
Furthermore, the clientelistic logic underwriting the human resources 
policy of the Greek state has produced a huge public administration; civil 
servants are often inadequately skilled to carry out effective policy-
design, in line with European needs and national interests. Oftentimes, 
even the rare, individual will-to-Europeanize, build solid institutional 
frameworks and provide the state with administrative continuity was 
translated, in a peculiarly Greek fashion, as a license to inactivity; Europe 
seemed to be something either too important to trifle with, or too exotic 
to discover – even at the top administrative levels. In either case, the 
result was poor policy implementation. Although reforms regarding 
state personnel have often been initiated, this has proved to be a 
particularly recalcitrant reform area. As Dimitrakopoulos and Passas 
(2004:143) note,  PASOK’s steady resistance in this area of reforms is 
largely due to its particular  electoral influence in the ranks of public 
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employees. According to Spanou and Sotiropoulos (2011:729), one of 
the most significant changes to the recruitment system has been Law 
3528/2007, which introduced more transparent criteria for the selection 
of senior civil servants, as well as personal interviews. However, this 
initiative was met with scepticism given the long tradition of public 
service politicisation and promotions depending on political criteria  
(Spanou and Sotiropoulos, 2011:729). 
The structural deficiencies of the EU policy mechanism and overall public 
administration are also evident regarding the transposition, 
implementation and evaluation of EU policies.  Greece has been falling 
behind in the transposition of EU directives to national law.  
Institutionally, this transposition is generally carried out either through 
primary domestic legislation, through presidential decrees, or through 
ministerial regulations/decisions (statutory instruments). The “Special 
Legal Department for European Community Law” of the MFA has 
traditionally been responsible for the implementation of Community 
Law. However, given the country’s disappointing record/performance, 
an “Office for International and European Affairs” was established under 
the Council of Ministers Secretariat. Its objective is to monitor, 
coordinate and provide legal and technical assistance to the authorities 
involved in the transposition of EU Directives into Greek Law and ensure 
the timely, correct and real implementation and application (Presidential 
Decree 18/2010)14. By the same token, the Vice-Premier assumed 
                                                 
14 “The Office communicates all new Directives to the competent national 
authorities/ministries the day these are published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union. Subsequently, it monitors progress in transposition on a daily basis and offers 
assistance to line ministries to facilitate the completion of the necessary work 
(logistical/technical support and legal advice). Twice a month tables with all non-transposed 
EU Directives are circulated to the competent national authorities/ministries. The Office is 
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competencies for the transposition of EU Directives, so that political 
pressure can be applied where considerable delays arise. An inter-
ministerial electronic information system monitors the transposition 
rates and infringements of EU law. It also incorporates data from three 
electronic directories: a detailed list of non-embedded directives, a 
summary list of non-embedded directives, and a summary of 
infringements of EU law. Each ministry continuously updates the system, 
so that civil servants and political personnel can access the latest 
information regarding the state of each Directive, while reports are 
published online on a monthly basis.15 
The overall transposition deficit reported in the Internal Market 
Scoreboard16 (No21, 23 Sep 2010) was 2.4%, the highest in the EU, while 
Greece was the member state with most long overdue directives 
(European Commission, 2010). This rather persistent trend17 reflects the 
chronic inefficiency of coordination between national authorities 
responsible for the transposition of EU Law (European Commission, 
2011:27). 
A further “implementation deficit” exists, even when transposition is 
carried out; the discrepancy between policy objectives and their actual 
implementation is evident18 (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004:5, 
                                                                                                                                            
also in charge of surveying and following-up on all infringement cases linked to non-
transposition or the incorrect transposition of EU Directives.” (European Commission, 
Internal Market Scoreboard No22, 2010:27)  
15 http://antiproedros.gov.gr/monitor-eu-directives 
16 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/index_en.htm  
17 The reported transposition deficit over time ranges between 7.5%  (Nov 1997) and 1.4% 
(Aug 2008). (European Commission Internal Market Scoreboards) 
18  Regarding implementation, Dimitrakopoulos and Passas (2004:8-9) stress that, although 
directives are supposed to outline policy objectives, letting national authorities select the 
specific policy instruments, they have become increasingly detailed, resembling regulations. 
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Glynos, 2011:12), with Greece still ranking high regarding infringements 
of EU Law (European Commission, 2011b). 
The inability to ensure the actual implementation of EU policies can be 
attributed to the lack of an evaluation system of Greece’s European 
policy. Although annual evaluation reports are issued by the European 
Commission, independent experts and institutional actors, these are 
rarely taken into account, even less trigger significant improvements in 
the domestic policy-making style. As Featherstone and Papadimitriou 
note, “institutional roles are undermined by structural deficiencies, 
cultural norms and conflicts of interest leading to a paradox of 
governance: government is itself institutionally weak, with a large, low-
skilled, and ill-coordinated bureaucracy. State resources are there to be 
used by the prevailing interests, this is paralleled by a culture of 
corruption, strong conflict: disjointed corporatism skews representation 
and prohibits consensus. Stark contrasts: unrestrained leadership, but 
lacking implementation strength; liberal democratic norms and 
structures with ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour; social dialogue and distorted 
interest representation; and a small state facing daunting external 
challenges with a domestic structure not of consensus but of severe 
conflict” (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008:201).  
 
4. Models of European Policy Making 
A look at the systems adopted by other member states is necessary. As 
suggested by Dimitrova and Maniokas “the trend towards examining the 
                                                                                                                                            
The growing importance of the ECJ rulings and resulting jurisprudence, has further reduced 
the space for manoeuver of member states, imposing heavy fines.   
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EU as a multi-level system of governance which has gained strength in 
the last decades, has opened the way for exploring the role national 
systems for EU policy making play” (Dimitrova and Maniokas, 2004: 2). 
Kassim, Peters and Wright (2000) have shown that EU policy-making 
increases the demands for policy coordination at the national level 
considerably. As the influence of the EU spreads, both to new policy 
areas and to new member states, the issue of national coordination of 
EU policy has become crucial. 
Over the years EU member states have opted for basically three systems 
to organise their European policy. These are: 
(1) MFA-centred System. Historically, this was the first model that 
practically all “old” member states used to adopt, particularly in 
times when European policy was indeed in many respects a major 
part of foreign policy. Dealing with European affairs through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was therefore for many years a rational 
choice. Conferring inter-ministerial coordination of this policy to 
the diplomatic machinery further meant entrusting the 
coordination of European affairs to a Minister/ Deputy Minister 
operating within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
(2) Prime Minister-centred System. Other countries have chosen to 
deal with European affairs through a centrally managed system of 
decision-making at the top of the executive, usually under the 
direct or indirect guidance of the Heads of Government. This 
choice “undoubtedly meant the maximum possible political 
support for the process and at the same time greater efficiency” 
(Dimitrova, 2002). 
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(3) European Ministry-centred System. The creation of a separate 
ministry for European Affairs is a rather new approach in dealing 
with European policy-making. It is more common among the 
newer member states, especially the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) that went through painful accession 
negotiations and a long Europeanisation process in order to join 
the EU.  
There are certainly hybrid systems, usually when European Ministers are 
seated at the Prime Minister’s office. Therefore, these general models of 
European policy-making at the national level differ from case to case, as 
each member state has a different way of organising its government 
mechanism. Member states that have joined the EU since the 1990s 
(such as Sweden and Finland, and later on Central East European 
countries like Poland, Slovakia etc.) had to go through an increasingly 
structured accession process and therefore developed autonomous 
mechanisms.  In most cases, the system set to handle the technical 
negotiations and the acquis transposition process was conferred to an 
autonomous Ministry (or Secretariat) of European Affairs. The chief 
negotiators, significant and powerful due to their success, became, in 
most cases, Ministers of European Affairs (see Kassim et al, 2000:38). 
As the issues on which the EU holds exclusive, shared or supporting 
competence have multiplied over the years, so has the technical 
expertise needed to effectively and efficiently manage European policy.  
Indeed, there is still considerable diversity in the responses of EU 
member states to the demands for coordination that European 
integration is placing on them. However, given the intensity of the need 
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for internal coordination and the increasingly blurred line of distinction 
between European and internal policy areas, many of the EU member 
states have moved the focal point of their EU policy away from their 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, mostly towards the Prime Minister level 
supplemented by inter-ministerial committees or relevant bodies 
(Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007; Larue, 2001; Persson, 2007). 
 
The Finnish System 
Some member states have progressively elaborated sophisticated and 
efficient systems, each reflecting the particular traditions and 
specificities within each country. Among the most efficient and 
comprehensive systems is that of Finland where the daily needs for 
coordination have led to more powers being transferred over the years 
to the Prime Minister’s Office. The latter prepares the general guidelines 
of Finnish EU policy and coordinates the preparation and handling of 
issues relating to the European Union in the ministries. Decisions 
concerning the general guidelines of Finland’s EU policy are made in the 
Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs, chaired by the Prime 
Minister, and assisted by the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs. EU 
affairs are coordinated at the civil servant level by the Committee for EU 
Affairs whose work is directed by the Prime Minister’s Office. The latter 
is also responsible for action relating to institutional questions and 
general development of the EU, as well as for the amendment of basic 
treaties of the European Union.19 
                                                 
19 On Finnish coordination system for EU affairs see: 
http://www.finland.eu/public/default.aspx?nodeid=35753&contentlan=2&culture=en-US, 
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The Prime Minister’s Office is also responsible for the preparation of 
European Council meetings and coordination of issues considered at the 
Council meetings. In addition, the Prime Minister’s Office handles the 
distribution of EU documents, maintenance of a register of documents, 
filing of documents and information services. The body of civil servants 
preparing EU affairs, mainly ministries, uses these services.  
A sophisticated coordination system has been established to ensure that 
Finland can present a coordinated position, in line with its overall EU 
policy, on issues under consideration in the European Union at each 
stage of preparation. This system involves competent ministries, the 
Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs, the Committee for EU 
Affairs and its EU sub-committees. The Government Secretariat for EU 
Affairs serves as the secretariat for the Cabinet Committee on European 
Union Affairs and the Committee for EU Affairs. The Permanent 
Representation of Finland to the European Union in Brussels also 
participates in the preparation of EU affairs. Moreover, in the discussion 
and coordination of EU affairs special attention is attached to the timely 
supply of information to and involvement of the Finnish Parliament. 
More precisely, the most important pillars of the Finnish EU system are 
the following: 
Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs. It meets once a week, 
usually on Friday mornings, to discuss politically, economically and 
legally important EU affairs; it debates Finland's priorities in all formal 
and informal Council meetings and is chaired by the Prime Minister.  
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Committee for EU Affairs. It is chaired by the head of the Government 
Secretariat for EU Affairs (State Secretary for EU Affairs) and usually 
meets on Wednesdays; it serves as an advisory and mediatory body in 
the coordination of EU affairs; discusses broad issues involving several 
ministries and also those issues that have not been resolved in the sub-
committees. In addition, the Committee for EU Affairs handles issues 
related to EU courts and enforcement and nominates national experts to 
EU institutions. Each ministry, the Prime Minister's Office, the Office of 
the President of the Republic, the Office of the Chancellor of Justice, the 
Bank of Finland and the Provincial Government of Åland are represented 
in the Committee for EU Affairs. Permanent Secretaries or their Deputies 
represent the ministries.  
EU Sub-Committees. The Committee for EU Affairs has appointed 37 
sector-specific preparative sub-committees. The sub-committees 
constitute the foundation for the preparation of EU affairs at the civil 
servant level. The chair and secretary of each EU sub-committee usually 
represent the competent ministry. The sub-committees can assemble in 
a restricted or extended composition. The restricted composition 
includes civil servants from the competent ministry and representatives 
of other ministries and central agencies. An extended composition 
comprises representatives from various interest groups and other 
concerned parties, too. Each sub-committee meets as necessary and has 
a representative of the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs.  
Government Secretariat for EU Affairs. The EU Secretariat responsible for 
the coordination of EU affairs was transferred from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister's Office. The Government 
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Secretariat serves as the secretariat for the Cabinet Committee on 
European Union Affairs and the chair and secretariat for the Committee 
for EU Affairs. Moreover, the Government EU Secretariat is represented 
in each of the preparative sub-committees appointed by the Committee 
for EU Affairs. The Secretariat's duties also include the preparation of 
European Councils, action relating to institutional questions and general 
development of the EU, the provision, together with competent 
ministries, of instructions to the Permanent Representation of Finland to 
the European Union, the furtherance of procedures relating to the 
coordination and preparation of EU affairs, responsibility for such EU 
affairs that do not fall within the competence of any other ministry, 
ensuring the flow of information between the Permanent 
Representation and national authorities, as well as involvement in 
government-organised training, communications activities and 
documentation relating to EU affairs. Finally, Finland’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs handles issues related to CFSP, the external relations of 
the EU, the overall development of the EU in cooperation with the 
Government Secretariat for EU Affairs and enlargement issues.20  
 
5. Policy Proposals for Greece in the New Context 
The newest developments at the European level progressively reveal an 
important change in the framework within which the Member States will 
be expected to operate; indeed in Greece’s case the change will be of 
dramatic proportions. Designing a new system for Greece’s EU policy in 
                                                 
20 See 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=15622&contentlan=2&culture=en-US 
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the midst of these challenges, one evidently needs to place it in its fast 
evolving European context. The EU of the 2010s is vastly different from 
the EC of the 1980s. At first, this was a result of the increased 
competency areas, having evolved from a Coal and Steel Community to a 
Monetary Union. Additionally, the Union’s last enlargement rounds have 
had consequences on the role of each Member State and the degree of 
its power to exert influence. 
With the advent of the cascading euro crisis and the new institutional 
arrangements introduced by the Eurozone, under the pressure of 
Germany and France, substantial change is likely to occur. However, this 
will be a tall order for Greece; the crisis has already propelled a tsunami 
of change throughout the whole country, dislocating established 
economic and social relationships, expanding poverty and creating 
deeply felt anxieties. In this radically new context the role that Greece 
has to map out to surpass its present crisis is in no way similar to the one 
it adopted upon its accession. It needs to overhaul its European policy in 
a different international but also national context. 
5.1 Solidarity and Responsibility 
The more integrated economic governance structures currently designed 
will deeply influence the handling of EU affairs. Pooling sovereignty 
without losing sovereignty will be a tall order. But, the crux of the 
challenge faced now by all Europeans is that they have to manage the 
web of interdependence they have created. It must be re-designed, 
rather than simply corrected and this needs to be done in an 
environment full of uncontrollable market pressures and all sorts of 
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antagonisms and unpredictability. The unprecedented pace of events 
and the increased complexities demand from European leaders a bold 
and coherent vision for the future. In an interdependent Eurozone, no 
country can secure its prosperity on its own. The economies, even the 
very fate of individual European countries, are now dramatically affected 
by decisions taken in many other places in the world. 
Europe has always been about jointly building a better future for its 
people through setting common goals; and this is how it should manage 
the dynamics of the present crisis. The problems raised by the euro crisis 
cannot be solved by member states acting alone. They require a 
balanced pooling of sovereignty. Europe is the world’s most sustained 
and far-reaching experiment of this kind. This European evolution is an 
open-ended process. The building and reshaping may never be complete 
as the pace of change around us accelerates. On the way, mistakes have 
been made in both the design and the execution of European policies; 
however, the worst fears of European skeptics have never materialized.  
There are certainly rejectionists of all kinds who advocate withdrawal 
from integration. But the lesson from Europe’s history is that this is a 
false prospect. Interdependence cannot be rolled back: no single nation 
can insulate itself from the contagion of the financial crisis. Pooling 
sovereignty and establishing common, rule-based responses builds 
mutual defenses against common threats and will bring Europe back to 
stability and prosperity. This applies even more to the Union and 
Member-States of today, than it did to the Europe of the past decades. 
The threats the EU is facing cannot be met successfully by separate 
efforts.  
  35 
Interdependence within the EU means that failure in any Member-State 
is rapidly translated into failure within Europe. Hence, the Eurozone 
countries have to align their policies as never before. Sharing the same 
currency requires maintaining financial solidarity. It is understandable 
that governments and public opinion in some AAA countries find the 
way Mediterranean countries have managed their public finances 
unsatisfactory. But to avoid this terrible situation, the terms of mutual 
policy surveillance should have been established on the introduction of 
the single currency.  
In all events, it is the implementation of Eurozone actions that will be 
persuasive beyond EU borders. Markets have clearly signaled that 
declarations, often simply for communication or other domestic 
purposes, or minor reforms that are limited to containment, will no 
longer suffice to satisfy investors. Stepping up the governance of the 
Euro means taking the only road that will strengthen the European 
project: there can be no single currency without a fiscal union with joint 
budgets, agreed discipline and, above all, solidarity.  
The crisis has speeded up history. Even if matters are still in an 
embryonic state, the EU has nevertheless managed to make changes 
that seemed unthinkable before the crisis: the EFSF in May 2010 was in a 
way a start to budgetary federalism; it has laid the foundation of 
European financial solidarity. With the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), the EU will have in Sarkozy’s words: “a European Monetary 
Fund”. The ECB has significantly extended and adapted its intervention 
techniques.  
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This is certainly not enough and much more needs to be done; it is 
overwhelmingly in Greece’s interest that Europe plays a leading role in 
shaping the global transitions that are underway; that it takes the lead, 
in both words and deeds. “Whatever the outcome from the current 
Greek difficulties, it is clear that the future of the euro, if not the EU 
itself, is at stake”.21  
There are important risks, but it is certain that if decisive leadership does 
not emerge, the prospect for a stronger Europe and a stronger Greece 
will be dim. These points to the core challenge for the Greek leaders; to 
spur growth and protect the country against irreversible harm. There 
have been plenty of mistakes in the designing, the negotiation and the 
execution of policies. The lack of consistency, accountability and 
transparency has undermined public trust. 
 
5.2 A New European Policy System for Greece 
In this new European context, Greece needs a complete overhaul of its 
public policy making system in the direction of (i) effectiveness in 
establishing goals and strategic objectives with high reliability, speed and 
accuracy in their application, (ii) adequate means to attain the objectives 
(human resources, organization, equipment and resources etc), and (iii) 
flexibility in implementing the strategic goals (contingency); “the means 
should facilitate the achievement of goals, rather than objectives 
adapting to the means” (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 99-
100). 
                                                 
21 Guy Verhofstadt, “Only a Finance Minister and Fiscal Union will do”, The Financial Times, 
28.9.2011. 
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As to European policy in particular, in a rare policy recommendation, 
Glynos (2011), proposed that the focus of the required reform should be 
internal policy coordination and implementation, rather than external 
negotiation and representation as such, which, in his view, have 
improved substantially over the years. Additionally, he pointed to the 
need of strengthening, reorganizing and better coordinating of the 
existing mechanisms, rather than creating new ones. He also argued that 
the Greek state machinery and the political system have acquired the 
necessary experience and know-how of policy formulation, and that the 
focus should now shift to the fine-tuning of these mechanisms and 
overall evaluation (Glynos, 2011: 13-15). 
Institutionally, he proposed to move the General Secretariat of European 
Affairs (encompassing the DG “C”) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
the highest executive authority, i.e. to the Office of the Prime Minister. 
This General Secretariat for European Affairs would “coordinate and 
evaluate the implementation of EU policies and operations in Greece, 
the design and processing of national positions, and the representation 
and negotiation in EU bodies (in close cooperation with the MFA and 
embassies)”. All Ministries and governmental agencies should report to 
the General Secretariat of European Affairs, whereas the MFA should 
retain “all exclusive responsibilities it has over the other ministries, 
those relative to the CFSP, enlargement and development policies, and 
should also have an important role in the horizontal policies such as 
immigration. It should also retain responsibilities in important 
negotiations even if they are of an exclusive economic nature” (Glynos, 
2011:15-16). 
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Glynos advises against the creation of new, parallel structures, 
competitive to the existing ones; he evaluates them as “adequately 
experienced” and proposes the reinforcement, restructuring and 
coordination of existing mechanisms, stressing that they should have the 
“maximum possible participation in the elaboration of national positions 
and representation and negotiation in the institutions of the Union” 
(2011:14). 
In another rare policy recommendation, Stoforopoulos and 
Makridimitris (1997:64) have proposed the creation of an “Inter-
ministerial Committee for EU Affairs”, which would play a critical role in 
the coordination and cooperation between the dispersed services and 
related responsibilities in order to ensure the coherence of national 
positions in the EU decision-making bodies, the systematic planning and 
control of representation, and the optimal absorption, distribution and 
use of funds from various community and development programs”. They 
proposed that it be placed under both the General Secretariat of the 
Government, and the MFA (directly linked to the DG “C”). 
In all events, it is about time for Greece, which has currently embarked 
in a systematic effort to overhaul its entire state machinery, to reform. It 
needs to address this issue with the aim of not just catching up with the 
numerous changes that have occurred within the European system over 
the past two decades; it needs to introduce reforms in anticipation of 
the dramatically new policy coordination requirements imposed by the 
economic crisis. In view of the very difficult challenges ahead, it is, 
therefore, imperative that EU policy coordination takes place at the 
highest possible political level. The new system should be able to 
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respond to the need for problem-solving through arbitration, as well as 
for flexibility and speedy decisions. 
In designing the new system, there are certainly some practical 
considerations that need to be taken into account. For example, as 
suggested by some authors, in the MFA-centered model, the national 
positions “would be more in tune with European discussions and norms, 
and less focused on domestic “agendas”. “MFAs have gained the role of 
coordinators of EU affairs in most Member-States, because of their 
supposedly neutral position in the sectoral and, accordingly, inter-
ministerial conflicts” (Dimitrova, 2004:15). Diplomats who are mostly 
focused on alliance building and search for consensus staff them; they 
are also less likely to defend a sectoral point of view, or focus only on 
the domestic agenda.22  
These remarks also apply to Greece. If the EU Affairs General Secretariat 
were to be simply removed from the MFA (as suggested by Glynos), the 
latter would automatically be deprived of any real capacity to monitor, 
let alone manage EU affairs. More importantly, would a Secretary 
General, even if seated at the top executive institution, be able to 
exercise the power necessary to coordinate the “barons” of any Greek 
government? If not, would the Prime Minister instead be responsible for 
managing inter-ministerial rivalries on a daily basis?  
 
                                                 
22 Rometsch and Wessels go as far as claiming that European integration was possible only 
because in Germany the coordination of European Affairs was managed by the MFA 
(Rometsch & Wessels, 1996). 
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5.3 A New System for New Needs 
Greece’s new European policy system needs to address the new 
challenges composed by the interplay between the new Eurozone (and 
EU) framework, the current multifaceted crisis, and the outstanding 
needs of the country’s economy. Close coordination with the EU 
institutions and other partners is strongly required to overcome this 
Herculean task. Within this context, European policy will be deemed 
even more important; it will essentially expand to new policy goals and 
areas, outside the spectrum of what was traditionally perceived as 
foreign and European affairs. 
The institutional arrangements for the Eurozone members and the new 
decision-making framework at the European level will undoubtedly leave 
less room for maneuvering to member states. This will be particularly 
true for Greece, whose European policy will henceforth be seen as a 
crucial component of the country’s exit strategy from the current crisis. 
In this new setting the economy has obviously taken and will remain 
center stage.  
These fundamentally different circumstances call for a new designing of 
Greece’s European policy mechanism. Minor adjustments to the existing 
one are unlikely to lead to increased efficiency in mapping out the Greek 
position and future within the European family. These parameters 
indicate a need for new structures: with its limited capacities to deal 
with the Eurozone issues, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot be called 
to coordinate the country’s exit from the crisis. Change is long overdue.  
It is time for the Greek government to also institutionally acknowledge 
that the full spectrum of European policy issues will be seen through the 
  41 
lens of the economy. However, assigning the handling of both traditional 
and new European affairs to the ministry of Finance/Economics would 
create a gigantic structure eventually leading to greater inefficiency. 
Such a workload would be unbearable (and politically unrealistic) for a 
single minister/ministry to handle. Additionally, no Prime Minister could 
relinquish responsibility for such a vast portfolio to a single Minister.  
In view of the above, Greece’s new EU policy system could consist of the 
following basic pillars: 
(1) European affairs should be placed under the direct supervision of 
the Prime Minister, to be assisted by a Deputy Prime Minister, or a 
Minister for European Affairs (DPM/MEA) heading the 
“Government Secretariat for European Affairs” (GSEA). The choice 
of the precise ministerial ranking is directly political and can only be 
decided by the Prime Minister himself. However, a Deputy Minister 
or Secretary General would not be able to exercise the power 
needed to coordinate Ministers. What is essential is placing the 
management of EU affairs directly under the guidance, arbitration 
and ultimately the responsibility of the Prime Minister but through 
a politically strong Minister. This would reflect the political will for 
arbitration and coordination at the highest level, leaving less room 
for inter-ministerial conflicts, personal agendas or resistance by 
procrastination. It is equally essential that a coordination system be 
established to ensure that Greece can present coherent positions, 
in line with its overall EU interests, on issues under consideration in 
the EU at each stage of preparation. 
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The GSEA would prepare the general guidelines of Greece’s EU 
policy and coordinate the handling of EU issues in the ministries, as 
well as the involvement of the Parliament. Creating a new Ministry, 
however, is both unrealistic and unnecessary in the current 
circumstances. It is therefore proposed that the DPM/MEA should 
use a highly experienced but limited group, staffed equally by 
experienced civil servants chosen through meritocratic processes 
and by highly competent external experts chosen through a 
competition along the lines of European standards. The aim would 
be to create a blending of experienced civil servants with outside 
experts in European affairs, also serving as the secretariat for the 
“Euro-ministerial Council” (see below). In addition, the presently 
MFA-based “Special Legal EU Service” would need to be transferred 
to the new Vice President/Minister for European Affairs. In fact, the 
political responsibility has already been transferred to the 
Government Council since 2007. 
(2) The “Euro-Ministerial Council” (Cabinet Committee on European 
Affairs). The second pillar of the new system would consist of a 
collective inter-ministerial instrument: ministers responsible for 
issues to be dealt with in the agenda of each EU summit would 
participate in a “Euro Ministerial Council”, chaired by the PM; it 
would be tasked with setting Greece’s priorities, preparing the 
national positions and defining external negotiation strategy. This 
committee would replace the current system of preparatory 
meetings under the Alternate/Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
thereby signalling the increased importance of EU affairs and the 
political punch that will be increasingly needed.  
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(3) The MFA and the Permanent Representation in Brussels. This 
transfer of responsibility for European affairs can be expected to 
cause reactions on the part of the MFA. As research has already 
indicated, in the MFA-centered model, national positions would be 
more in tune with European discussions and norms, and less 
focused on domestic agendas, with MFAs assuming a coordinating 
role because of their supposedly neutral position in inter-ministerial 
conflicts (Kassim et al, 2000: 238). However, given the breadth of 
economic and other technical issues and lack of adequate human 
resources, these are competences that the MFA has long ceased to 
effectively and efficiently perform. Still, there are certainly some 
valid arguments, such as:  
(i) The future role of the Permanent Representation in 
Brussels, which is currently under the supervision of the 
MFA and plays a central role in the day-to-day handling of 
EU affairs. It will need to remain under the guidance of the 
MFA but also be directly linked to the DPM/MEA.  
(ii) Enlargement issues are also central. In view of the next 
enlargement round and the geopolitical zone it will cover 
(i.e. the immediate neighbourhood of Greece, namely 
Turkey and the W. Balkans) these negotiations are highly 
political and of paramount importance to Greece’s foreign 
policy. Thus, they need to remain under the 
guidance/supervision of the MFA.  
(iii) The MFA would be deprived of any real capacity to monitor 
EU affairs if its best diplomats and experts were to be 
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transferred to the GSEA. It is not possible for the whole DG 
“C” of the MFA to be transferred to the Prime Minister’s 
Office; it therefore needs to keep at least part of its staff 
and remain an important pillar of Greece’s EU machinery. 
(4) The fourth pillar of the system would be the creation of ‘EU cells’ in 
each ministry. These ‘cells’ would answer directly to each and every 
Minister and to the DPM/MEA through weekly meetings of their 
Heads, coordinated and chaired by the GSEA. They would enhance 
each Ministry’s technical expertise by collaborating with the GSEA, 
the other cells and the Permanent Representation in Brussels. 
Individual foreign experts (possibly through a system of 
secondment) as well as experts from other member states and/or 
members of the Reichenbach Task Force could assist these cells in 
their first steps by providing much-needed technical expertise to 
Greece’s public administration. Essentially, they would become “EU 
focal points”, and thus also a network enhancing the efficiency of 
EU-related work in each ministry, including the provision of help to 
ensure the timely transposition of EU law. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
In the present critical situation of cascading failures, painful reforms and 
incredible shocks, Greece is invited to confirm its commitment to a 
dynamic but mistrusted Europe. An inward – looking, divided, and 
uncertain Greece, cannot hope to solve the present dilemmas. If 
attention is focused on marginal improvements to existing policies, 
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Greece will not be able to escape from the present vicious cycle of 
recession and pessimism.  
To cope with the present crisis, Greeks need to be convinced that the EU 
has the right recipe for Greece and that the country will recover a 
capacity for growth and strengthen its competitiveness. They also need 
to be convinced that the EU will efficiently unfold a protective shield for 
Greece in the turbulences of a globalized economy, where power has 
been moving outwards into new configurations. The latter have little to 
do with governments at any level, pay no attention to political and 
geographical boundaries, and occasionally have more impact than 
governments. This is a disturbing prospect and it is understandable that 
practically all Greeks should want to slow the range and pace of change 
to a more bearable rate. At the same time, paradoxically, the Eurozone’s 
economic imbalances that helped the crisis grow have led to boosting 
European integration by enhancing the political part of the monetary 
union.  
A well-organized European policy, based on a leading coordinating role 
to be exercised by a DPM/MEA (seated close to the Prime Minister) 
would help address some of the present system’s deficiencies. It would 
also assist the country to develop and follow a more proactive, efficient 
and longer-term strategy in European affairs. 
Greece needs a comprehensive, realistic and viable plan and a defining 
mission to restore its momentum. Meeting this challenge will require 
Greeks to assume their own responsibilities and work together with the 
Commission and the other member states as never before in history. It 
will also require the understanding and effective assistance by its EU 
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partners to manage the upheavals of a catastrophic and contagious 
crisis.  For the new Greece to secure the much-needed solidarity of its 
partners and to regain its role within a stronger Europe, an effective EU 
policy-making system is an indispensable tool. 
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